John McLean is a three-decade veteran of hammering out labor deals from both sides of the table. He's familiar with all the players in last year's WGA strike and, while no longer an active participant, he has developed strong and often contrarian opinions about what led to the work stoppage, its effectiveness and how it was settled.
McLean spent over 20 years as a top CBS labor exec and was VP of industrial and labor relations when he succeeded Brian Walton in 1999 as exec director of the WGA West. He was fired in 2005 and replaced by organizing director David Young in an expression of the board's dissatisfaction with the 2004 feature-primetime deal.
McLean hasn't commented previously on the WGA strike. Here's his take.
Q: What do you think of the 2008 WGA deal?A: I think it is a terrible deal --- perhaps the worst deal ever negotiated by the creative guilds. If it was the best deal negotiated in the last 30 years, why did the WGA keep their members on strike for additional three weeks after the DGA made their deal? Why hasn't SAG stepped up and taken this great deal? As I see it, the deal has four problem areas - digital use, new media, DVDs and reality.
Q. What's the specific problem with the concept of payment for digital use in the WGA's deal?A. In 1984, the producers negotiated a deal for video that only paid on 20%. They said that they only received revenues on 20%; the other 80% went to manufacturing, distribution and marketing costs. In 2001, the WGA negotiated a deal for digital rentals that paid on 100%. We argued that the producers received 100% of the revenues and we should be paid on 100%. In 2008, the WGA negotiated a deal for digital sales that pay on 50%. This was not a 50% increase, as claimed, but rather a 50% rollback.
Q: What do you see as the problems in the new media part of the deal?A: In 2001, the producers proposed a "repurposing" provision that allowed the producer to replay a show for two weeks without paying residuals. The WGA rejected this proposal. We argued that if the producer derived revenue from the replay, then the creative talent should be paid residuals. In 2008, the WGA accepted 17- and 24-day windows where writers are not paid residuals for the replay of shows.
Q: Is it very difficult to negotiate deals that include new technology?A: When you are negotiating "new technology" deals, you are shooting in the dark. In 1980 and 1981, SAG and WGA struck over "made for Pay" residuals. Both guilds got terrible deals. DGA did not strike, but got a very good deal. When you don't know where the market for a new technology is, it is very difficult to negotiate a deal. What you don't want to do is give away keep provisions like no residuals for 17 and 24 days. They will use the free replay provision as a beachhead and try to expand it into other areas.
Q: What was the problem with DVD residuals in the deal?A: The WGA proposed a major improvement in the DVD formula and this was SAG's most important proposal. They got nothing. The only improvement in the 1984 video formula came in 2001, when we negotiated a $5,000 script fee for writers.
Q. What was the problem with the WGA's strategy to use the negotiations to achieve jurisdiction over reality shows?A: In 2004, the WGA negotiated an organizing provision for reality shows similar to the DGA provision. The DGA had used this provision to reach agreements on over 100 reality shows. The current leadership of the WGA disagreed with this strategy and blocked our attempts to organize and negotiate reality shows on a show-by-show basis. They argued that they would negotiate a provision in the 2008 agreement that would force the industry to recognize the WGA for all reality shows. In 2008, the WGA failed to achieve anything in organizing reality shows.
Q: When you conducted your first WGA negotiations in 2001 as executive director, SAG's termination date was only two months after the WGA's. Was that helpful?A: Yes. In 2001, the WGA proposed that SAG and AFTRA join us in negotiating a new agreement. It is difficult to hold three creative guilds together in negotiations. SAG and AFTRA had their disagreements, but we were able to convince them to work together. We succeeded in making Fox a network (after 15 years of failed attempts), establishing the principle that digital downloads should be paid for at 100% (rather than 20% on DVDs), plus significant increases in made for pay and made for basic.
Q: Why wasn't there more coordination in 2007 between the WGA and SAG?A: In 2007, (AMPTP president) Nick Counter had attempted to negotiate a deal with WGA. The WGA negotiating chair, John Bowman, had spoken with Counter at a WAG pension and health meeting and said he wanted to try and make a deal without a strike. When Counter entered negotiations, he quickly realized a deal without a strike was not possible. The producers were faced with a choice: Was it better to take a strike with the WGA in November or wait until July and face a likely strike from WGA, SAG and AFTRA? The producers opted for a strike with WGA. Their language at the table and their proposals were clearly inflammatory and made to provoke a strike. When the WGA struck, the producers refused to continue negotiations.
Q: The strike began on Nov. 5 and negotiations restarted in late November for two weeks, then collapsed on Dec. 7. What happened after that?A: They waited until the DGA was prepared to negotiate and made their deal. Only then did the producers go back to the WGA and present the DGA deal as the only acceptable deal. The WGA was boxed in. To gain leverage, the WGA would have had to stay on strike until July, when the SAG agreement expired. That strategy would require an eight-month strike by the WGA. The WGA opted to make a deal with a few minor modifications. At this point, DGA and WGA had made deals and SAG was boxed in. Counter added deals with AFTRA and IATSE to further nail down the pattern deal. In the end, Counter had orchestrated one of the most effective "divide and conquer" strategies the entertainment industry had ever seen.
Q: Do you think the WGA leaders were goaded into a strike?A: It should have been evident to the WGA leadership what Counter was orchestrating and should not have been provoked into a premature strike. If the WGA had not struck in November, but waited until July, they could have presented a united front to the producers. Further, it would have put DGA in a much stronger bargaining position.
Q: It's a commonly held belief that the WGA strike made the DGA's position stronger. How would the DGA's position have been strengthened had the writers not been on strike?A: When DGA entered into negotiations in late December, their members who work in TV had already been on a "de facto" strike for eight weeks. When a guild enters early negotiations, its most effective weapon is not a strike but the threat to leave negotiations. This threat would clearly ring hollow to the producers, considering that the DGA members had already been on a "de facto" eight-week strike and their below-the-line members had no or little stake on the strike issues of digital and new media residuals. If the WGA had not struck in November, the DGA could have threatened to walk away from negotiations if the producers did not agree to their proposals on residuals. The DGA could have told the producers "we are out of here -- go make your deal with SAG, AFTRA and WGA."
Q: What did SAG do wrong?A: SAG failed to heed the Godfather's advice to his son -- "Keep your friends close and your enemies closer." SAG allowed their friends at the WGA to strike prematurely and their adversaries at AFTRA to go off and make their own deal. Once WGA and AFTRA made their deal, SAG's position was untenable. SAG has lost this game and they need to get focused on the next game. SAG needs to heal its rift with AFTRA. Any time two unions share the same jurisdiction, they need to stand together or it will be a race to the bottom.
Q: What about former WGA West president John Wells saying in an email late in the strike that the strike had enabled the DGA to get an acceptable deal?A: You have to look at John's email in the context of the time period it was written. The DGA had made their deal and the WGA was 11 weeks into their strike. John remembered the 1988 WGA strike that lasted 22 weeks and realized the same deal could have been made eight weeks into that strike. He did not want to see a repeat of the 1988 strike. John's email gave the WGA leadership the cover to make a deal. His email was an act of statesmanship.
Contact Dave McNary at
dave.mcnary@variety.com